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ANTITRUST ADMINISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT
John T. Chadwell*

importance of the nation's antitrust policy requires that administration and enforcement powers and techniques be equal to
the huge task of effectively safeguarding competition. The recommendations of the Attorney General's Committee represent a statesmanlike effort to balance the need for effective enforcement with the need
for the preservation of fairness and the conservation of time and resources in antitrust litigation. Some of the recommendations will undoubtedly engender heated controversy; others seem relatively uncontroversial.
Many individual topics are dealt with in the Report of the committee and space does not permit comment upon all of them. The
following discussion is confined to what would seem to be the most
important aspects of the committee's work on administration and enforcement. The section of the Report is divided into four parts, and
the comments made here follow the same organization: (I) The Department of Justice; (2) The Federal Trade Commission; (3) Related
Jurisdiction of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission; and ( 4) Private Antitrust Suits.

T

HE

A.

The Department of Justice

Of the three sources of antitrust enforcement (Department of
Justice, Federal Trade Commission and private litigants), Department
of Justice proceedings command the most attention in the Report.
Armed with the right to invoke the grand jury in Sherma:i:i Act cases
and to call forth the full equity powers of the court in both Sherman
and Clayton Act cases, the department possesses enormous powers of
investigation and prosecution. The procedures under which it initiates
investigations and prosecutes litigation necessarily merit the most careful scrutiny. The Report deals with the functioning of these procedures at their successive stages.

I. Antitrust Investigations
If there is to be antitrust enforcement, both the prosecutor and the
prosecuted have a stake in adequate investigative techniques. Insuf"" Member, lliinois Bar.-Ed.
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ficient investigative powers for the prosecutor may frustrate enforcement. But equally great is the danger, as the committee notes, that
poor investigation may result in the ill-considered filing of suits which
would not be brought at all if the prosecutor possessed the facts. Thus
a "futile trial" may occur, "exhausting the resources of the litigants
and increasing court congestion."1 Although such abortive use of law
suits is a hazard in all kinds of litigation, it is a peculiarly da:n,gerous
one in the antitrust field with its notoriously protracted and expensive
trials. Consequently both government and industry have a common
interest in the investigative powers and procedures of the Department
of Justice.
The question is whether the department's investigative powers
are presently sufficient, or whether changes are needed. The committee points out that the availability of the grand jury for criminal proceedings under the Sherman, Act now gives the department ample
powers for a full investigation. 2 As a civil investigator, however, the
department theoretically has no greater pre-complaint investigative
powers than any private litigant. It possesses none of the civil precomplaint powers enjoyed by its sister enforcement agency, the Federal
Trade Commission.3 It must rely upon the voluntary cooperation of
.those under investigation, upon information obtained from third
persons, and upon its own investigative ingenuity, without benefit of
compulsory process. Cooperation is most often forthcoming. 4 This
1 R:sPoRT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL's NATIONAL CoMMITTEE To STUDY THE
ANTITRUST LAws, March 31, 1955, p. 344 (hereinafter referred to as REPORT, followed
by the page number).
2 "A federal grand jury is perhaps the most powerful inquisitorial body in a free country." Nitschke, "Procedure in Antitrust Investigations," 1950 UNIV. ILL. L. FoRUM 593
at 604. On grand jury proceedings in antitrust cases, see Wadmond, "Investigation,"
A.B.A. Antitrust Section Proceedings, Aug. 18-19, 1954, 32 at 42; Hollabaugh, "Development of an Antitrust Case," A.B.A. Antitrust Section Proceedings, April 1-2, 1954, p. 14
at 18.
8 The Federal Trade Commission Act states that the commission may require reports
under oath (§6), may have access to and the right to copy corporate documents (§9) and
may compel the testimony of witnesses and the production of documents "relating to any
matter under investigation" (§9), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §41 et seq. These powers have been
characterized by the United States Supreme Court as comparable to those of a grand jury,
United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 70 S.Ct. 357 (1950). See Babcock,
"Legal Investigation," A.B.A. Antitrust Section Proceedings, April 1-2, 1954, p. 157 at 158:
"This combination of fact finding power represents the broadest power available to any
agency of the government."
4 A dissenting member states that not more than 10% of those who are asked for data
refuse to cooperate, RllPORT 348. See T1Ml!ERG, THE ANrrrnusT LAws FROM THE POINT
OF VIEw OF A GOVERNMENT ATTORNEY 32 (1949): " .••• defense counsel, in the
majority of cases, pursue the path of voluntary cooperation." See also Nitschke, "Procedure
in Antitrust Investigations," 1950 UNIV. ILL. L. FoRuM 593 at 595. On voluntary cooperation generally see Wadmond, "Investigation," A.B.A. Antitrust Section Proceedings,
August 18-19, 1954, p. 32 at 37.
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is not always so, however, and at times without first trying other
avenues, the department has taken the lawful though objectionable
expedient of using the criminal grand jury process to investigate its
prospective civil case.5
The committee strongly disapproves of use of the grand jury where
criminal proceedings are not contemplated on the ground that this is
a perversion of the grand jury system and "'debases the law by tarring
respectable citizens with the brush of crime when their deeds involve
no criminality."6 On the other hand, it states that this type of resort to
the grand jury has been forced upon the department by lack of any
adequate pre-complaint civil discovery alternative.
To meet these problems, the committee proposes legislation authorizing the attorney general to issue a "Civil Investigative Demand"
upon corporations, partnerships or associations compelling the production of documents. The documents demanded ( correspondence and
other business records), would have to be "relevant to particular antitrust offenses stated to be under investigation," and the demand would
have to "describe the records and data sought with reasonable specificity."7 A Justice Department custodian would be established to preserve the documents and they would be available for use only for the
pending investigation, for submission to a grand jury or for ensuing
Antitrust Division or Federal Trade Commission proceedings. The
district courts would be vested with jurisdiction to order compliance
with the demand, or to modify or set it aside upon a showing that the
demand is unreasonable in scope, irrelevant with respect to the specific
offenses under investigation, or inadequate in its description of the
material required. The demand could apparently be served on any
corporation, partnership or association, whether itself suspect or not,
but it apparently could not be served on an individual.
The proposed "demand" would be limited to documents and
would not be available to compel the attendance and testimony of persons. The committee registers its disapproval of any subpoena powers
that would permit the summoning of witnesses by the attorney general for interrogation under oath or generally require producµon of
5 It seems improbable that any of the following huge recent civil cases, all of which
began with grand jury investigations, were ever seriously intended as criminal prosecutions:
United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., (D.C. ill. 1954) 126 F. Supp. 235;
United States v. Morgan, (D.C. N.Y. 1953) 118 F. Supp. 621; United States v. Armour
& Co., complaint :filed Sept. 15, 1948, dismissed without prejudice (D.C. ill. 1954) CCH
TRADB REc. REP., 10th ed., ,r66,117.
6 fuPOR'l' 345.
7 REPon'l' 346.
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documents except within the limits defined in the proposal. Such
power, the committee says, would be comparable to the "administrative subpoena" used by the Federal Trade Commission and other
regulatory agencies and would be "alien to our legal traditions, readily
susceptible to grave abuse and, moreover, seems unnecessary." 8
It is not readily apparent to the present writer how the Civil Investigative Demand proposal of the committee differs, other than in
degree, from the "administrative subpoena" which the committee so
strongly dislikes. Of course, the exclusion of the right to call witnesses
is a substantial difference. But in most government antitrust cases,
documentary evidence is the backbone of the complainant's case and
testimony, especially of the defendant's own officers and employees,
plays a distinctly secondary role. 9 Given the documentary power, it
would seem that the Department of Justice, for most purposes, would
as a practical matter be put in a position approximating that of the
Federal Trade Commission. Nor does the requirement of "relevance"
in the proposed demand seem more than a minor limitation. It would
be an unimaginative prosecutor indeed who could not state the "specific antitrust offenses under jnvestigation" with sufficient breadth to
insure production of all of the documents he could hope to use.
The proposed demand lodges what would amount to an important
subpoena power in an executive officer. Whatever the safeguards intended by the proponents of such a grant of executive inquisitorial
power, there would seem to be little to prevent the evolution of this
investigative weapon into a virtual civil counterpart of the grand jury
or of the Federal Trade Commission, without the special safeguards
attached to those institutions. In the hands of an unrestrained prosecutor, this amount of personal power could readily fall into abus.e and
become an instrument of harassment.10
The committee's goal of taking the grand jury out of the civil antitrust arena is highly laudable. But there is no guarantee that this
would result from the proposal. 11 Even if the Civil Investigative
s REPORT 345-346.
9 See Nitschke, "Procedure in Antitrust Investigations," 1950 Umv. Iu. L. FoRuM
593 at 596; HAMILTON AND TILL, ANTrrnuST IN ACTION, T.N.E.C. Monograph No. 16,
49-50 (1941). In its case in chief in United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Co.,
(D.C. ill. 1954) 126 F. Supp. 235, the government called only two witnesses, but introduced over 1,300 documents, A.B.A. Antitrust Section, REPORT OF CoM:MITTEB ON PRAcTICB AND PRocllDtrnB IN THE TRIAL oF ANTrrnuST CASns 105 (1954).
10 "Several members" dissented from the committee recommendation for reasons similar to those advanced in this article. REPORT 348.
11 Cf. the views of one committee member who objected to the proposal because he
saw it as a step to curtail the use of the grand jury. REPORT 348-349.
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Demand were not in itself an objectionable extension of power, there
is little assurance that its existence would "end the necessity for utilizing
the grand jury process in civil antitrust investigations."12 Although
the attorney general might perhaps feel under some moral obligation
to avoid the use of the grand jury in a clear case, he may reasonably
be uncertain at the beginning of the investigation as to whether the
ultimate proceeding should be civil or criminal or both.13 And in any
-case, it would not appear to be sound technique to let the execution
of legislative intent depend upon a moral obligation not written into
the law at all. The proposal does not insure correction of the evil
which it seeks to correct. Instead it launches a new and unduly extensive addition to the already great investigative powers of the department.
The grand jury has undoubtedly been misused in the past. But
it would be better to correct such misuse by legislation directly dealing
with the problem. This proposal does not do that. Nor is it, on the
other hand, vitally needed by the department. On balance, therefore, it
would seem preferable to defer the creation of this extraordinary
subpoena power in an executive officer at least until less drastic possibilities have been exhausted.

2.

The Decision to Proceed

The Report observes that "the burdens of antitrust proceedings on
all parties are generally so severe that litigation should be contemplated.
only after investigation discloses a probable offense and in a civil case,
only if the Department, after evaluation of all probable defenses, is
convinced that effective relief is obtainable."14
12 REPORT 347.
13 See, e.g., the

statement of government counsel in the "soap" case, United States v.
Procter & Gamble Co., 14 F.R.D. 230 at 233 (1953). According to the court, counsel
stated that the grand jury was employed to secure "determination as to what action should
be taken to enforce those laws through criminal proceedings, civil proceedings, or both."
For discussion from the point of view of a government attorney, see Hollabaugh, ''Development of an Antitrust Case," A.B.A. Antitrust Section Proceedings, April 1-2, 1954, p. 14 at
19-22.
14 REPORT 349. The record of government victories in antitrust cases in the past has
been sufficiently spotty to suggest that the "probable offense" standard suggested by the
committee has not always been observed. For figures, see HAMILTON AND TILL, A.NnTRUST IN ACTION, T.N.E.C. Monograph No. 16, Appx. A-F (1941). Cf. the recent
report of Assistant Attorney General Barnes: In the fiscal year 1954, the Antitrust Division
brought to a close 48 civil and 18 criminal actions. 32 of the civil cases were disposed of by
consent decree. Of the 12 which were litigated, the government won six and lost six. Four
civil complaints were apparently dismissed by the government during the year. Of the 18
criminal cases closed, 17 were disposed of by nolo contendere or guilty pleas. Barnes, Address, A.B.A. Antitrust Section Proceedings, Aug. 18-19, 1954, 22.
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The Report then discusses standards that should be applied by the
department in determining whether to institute criminal or civil proceedings or both.
Criminal Proceedings. The Sherman Act is basically cast in the
form of a criminal statute. Whether or not this was in keeping with
the kinds of violation in the contemplation of the draftsmen of 1890,
the steadily increasing economic emphasis of the act has rendered the
criminal prosecution less and less appropriate. Yet despite a steady
trend away from business conduct of the kind vy_hich could reasonably be dubbed "criminpl" in any realistic sense, the popularity of the
criminal antitrust prosecution has continued unabated. From 1890 to
date roughly half of all antitrust actions instituted by the Department
of Justice have been criminal prosecutions.15
The committee might well have recommended the outright abolition of the criminal prosecution as an outmoded device for Il!Odem
business regulation.16 But the Report avoids any direct discussion of
this problem, and only urges restraint in the use of the criminal prosecution. The great difficulty often confronting a businessman who
attempts to determine in advance whether his projected actions will
run afoul of the Sherman Act is properly stressed. And the recommendation is made that "criminal process should be used only where
the law is clear and the facts reveal a ,B.agrant offense and plain intent
unreasonably to restrain trade."1 .7
The committee's appeal to enforcement authorities to exercise a
reasoned discretion in the use of the power of criminal prosecution is
certainly sound. This sort of executive restraint has not always been
in evidence. Far too many indictments have been returned in areas
where the law was unsettled or where the economic complexities of the
15 See Cahill, ''Must We Brand American Business by Indictment as Criminal?"
A.B.A. Antitrust Section Proceedings, Sept. 17-18, 1952, 26 at 58. Slightly more than
half of the cases instituted under the present administration since March 1953 have been
criminal cases: See summaries in CCH TRADE REG. REP., 10th ed., ,i66,070 et seq.
16 See Cahill, supra, note 15. Cf. HAMILTON AND T1LL, ANnntusT IN Ac:noN,
T.N.E.C. Monograph No. 16 (1941) p. 81: "Yet, as the matter stands today, the criminal action is the law's most effective sanction." See also Berge, "Remedies Available to
the Government under the Sherman Act," 7 I.Aw AND CoNTEM. Pnon. 104 (1940). On
the trial of criminal antitrust cases, see Duncan, ''.The 'Big Case'-When Tried Criminally,"
4 WEsT. REs. L. REv. 99 (1953).
17 REPORT 349. Two members recommended that the law be amended "so as to make
criminal only acts of clear, certain and predatory violations of the law, and that the balance
be left to civil relief, governmental and private." REPORT 353. The committee rejected this
proposal as "impracticable." REPORT 351.
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case were such that trial in the atmosphere of a criminal indictment was
highly improper.18 The Report specifies several such examples of
abuse of the criminal process.19
The Report quotes and generally endorses a statement of policy
made to the committee by the present assistant attorney general in
charge of the Antitrust Division stating that criminal prosecutions are
now limited to (1) price fixing, (2) cases of specific intent to restrain
trade or monopolize, (3) boycotts or other predatory practices, and ( 4)
cases involving a second offense. The statement adds, however, that
"the Division feels free to seek an indictment in any case where a
prospective defendant has knowledge that practices similar to those in
which he is engaging have been held to be in violation of the Sherman
Act in a prior civil suit against other persons." 20
Apart from the rather ambiguous significance of the last-quoted
sentence and the committee's caveat that ''a second offense need not
warrant indictment," this statement of policy, if adhered to, should lay
the groundwork for a substantial administrative limitation upon future
criminal proceedings.
One additional word of caution not made by the committee seems
warranted. Even where the law and the facts are such as to justify
indictment of a corporation, the criminal process should be used most
sparingly against its executives and employees. The harm that indictment brings to the individual may be irremediable even by subsequent
dismissal or acquittal. 21 Good conscience should place the prosecutor
under the strongest moral sanction to avoid planting the stigma of
indictment upon the individual unless his participation in th~ violation has been clear, substantial and intentional. 22
In past years, the department has sometimes seemed more interested
in the indictment of large numbers of individual defendants than in
18 From 1890 to 1951, the government won only a little more than half of the criminal antitrust cases which actually went to trial. Duncan, "The 'Big Case'-When Tried
Criminally," 4 WEST. fus. L. fuv. 99 at 100 (1953). This record strongly suggests
that the use of criminal process in many of these cases was improper. It is true that a high
percentage of the criminal cases never go to trial but end in nolo rontendere pleas; but a
good many of the latter pleas have doubtless been made by defendants who might well
have won on trial but could not stand the enormous expense of a contest, Duncan, supra,
at 108.
19 fuPORT 351.
20 REPORT 350.
21 See Cahill, "Must We Brand American Business By Indictment As Criminal'?"
A.B.A. Antitrust Section Proceedings, Sept. 17-18, 1952, p. 26.
22 Section 14 of the Clayton Act states that a criminal violation by a corporation "shall
be deemed to be also that of the individual directors, officers, or agents of such corpora·
tion who shall have authorized, ordered, or done any of the acts constituting in whole or
in part such violation••••" 38 Stat. L. 736 (1914) 15 U.S.C. (1952) §24.
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their conviction. Sweeping criminal charges have been leveled at
many more individuals than the department could possibly have hoped
to convict under even the most favorable circumstances. In the Madison Oil case,23 for example, a total of :fifty-six individuals were indicted.
Only :five were ultimately held properly convicted, with ten others
pleading nolo contendere. In another case, the indictment alleged
violations in connection with the activities of a commodity exchange in
upstate New York. 24 Some of the indicted individuals had not been
members of the Exchange, were not employees of any corporation that
was a member, and as it subsequently developed, had been indicted
merely because their names had been entered in an Exchange minute
book as social visitors! These individuals were ultimately noll prossed,
but not until they had incurred the expense of employing counsel and
had suffered the embarrassment of newspaper publicity.
In other cases, important nationally known executives have been
-indicted and later acquitted or dismissed because there was little or no
evidence of their personal knowledge of or responsibility for the violative corporate conduct.25 Experience indicates that it is very rare
that more than a relatively few executives of a large corporation are
ever sufficiently closely identified with offending corporate acts to warrant their individual indictment, and it should be the policy of the
Antitrust Division to be even more careful in selecting individuals for
indictment than in determining in the :first instance whether the facts
warrant indictment at all. 26

Criminal and Civil Remedies. For criminal proceedings, the committee majority recommend an increase of the present maximum :fine
under the Sherman Act from $5,000 to $10,000. 27 A minority rec2s United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 60 S.Ct. 8ll (1940).
24United States v. Kraft Cheese Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1942) Case No. 641, CCH, FEDERAL A.NnntusT LAws: 55 individuals, 3 corporations and 1 trade associaton were indicted. The indictment was noll prossed as to all hut 4 defendants, who pleaded nolo
contendere.
25 See, for example, United States v. General Motors Corp., (7th Cir. 1941) 121
F. (2d) 376: 4 corporations and 19 individuals were indicted; the corporations were held,
hut all of the individuals were acquitted or dismissed. In United States v. St. Louis Dairy
Co., (D.C. Mo. 1948) 79 F. Supp. 12; Case 918, CCH, THE FEDERAL A.NnntusT LAws,
two companies and six individuals were indicted; the companies were found guilty, hut the
individuals were all acquitted. See also summary of criminal cases in Duncan, "The 'Big
Case'-When Tried Criminally," 4 WEsT. REs. L. REv. 99 at 116-121 (1953).
26 In the past few years, the policy of the Antitrust Division has apparently become
more careful in this respect. For example, in the recent case of United States v. Kansas
City Star Co., (D.C. Mo. 1955) CCH TRADE REG. RE.e., 10th ed., ,r66,062, 1f66,162,
one corporation and only two individuals were indicted; even so, one of the individuals
was later dismissed.
27 REPORT 352.
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ommend an increase to $50,000, the amount proposed by Attorney
General Brownell and embodied in a bill now pending in Congress.28
While a fine of $5,000 may be of no moment to a large corporation~
it may be a heavy penalty for an individual executive or employee~
particularly since it is not a deductible expense for federal income tax
purposes.29 Any dollar ceiling in excess of the present maximum
could work a grave injustice in the latter case while it would not constitute a significant difference in the former. Therefore, it is somewhat doubtful whether any increase in the criminal fine is really
called for. Also it is the fact of indictment and conviction that frequently constitutes the real penalty. 3 ° Further, the evidence of recent judicial attitudes suggests that there is no need for an increase.
The Report points out that the average fine actually imposed by judges
in all cases in the past eight years has been only $2,600, there being
numerous fines of only $500 or less. As stated earlier in this article,
the criminal prosecution as a means of business regulation should be
de-emphasized; a radical increase in the criminal penalty might have
the opposite effect. Under the circumstances, the committee's- recommendation is entirely adequate. 31
The only civil remedies discussed are the most drastic ·onesdivorcement, dissolution and divestiture. 32 The committee points out
that in only twenty-four litigated cases throughout the 65-year history
of the Sherman Act have the courts entered decrees for these forms of
relief, and as might be expected, twenty of those cases were merger or
28 H. R. 3659, 84th Cong., 1st sess. (1955), increasing the penalty to $50,000, has
passed the House at this writing and has been referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee,
CCH TRADB REc. REP., No. 19, April 7, 1955, p. 3. President Eisenhower's Economic
Report to the 84th Congress recommended that the maximum fine be raised "substantially."
Attorney General Brownell in letters to the Senate and House asked for an increase to
$50,000, stating that the deterrent effect of the present maximum $5,000 fine against
a large corporation is "almost negligible except for the stigma of conviction." CCH TRADB
REc. REP., No. 13, Jan. 27, 1955, p. 2.
29 Burroughs Bldg. Material Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (2d Cir.
1931) 47 F. (2d) 178; Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
(8th Cir. 1930) 40 F. (2d) 372.
30 The majority observed that " •••. the deterrent effect on a respected businessman
of any criminal indictment cannot be ignored." REPORT 352. At another point, two members pointed out: "The stigma of indictment tends to be the real punishment." RBPoRT
353, quoting Former Assistant Attorney General Wendell Berge.
31 It should be noted that $5,000 is not always the maximum penalty assessable against
a given defendant. In American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 66 S.Ct.
1125 (1946), the Court upheld fines of $15,000 imposed on each defendant under separate counts of conspiracy in restraint of trade, monopolizing, and conspiracy to monopolize;
the three counts all rested on the same facts; total fines in the case were $255,000.
32 See also the discussion of remedies in the Patent section of the REPORT, pp. 255259.
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close-knit combination cases.33 The Report quotes from the recent
Timken case that since "divestiture is a remedy to restore competition
and not to punish those who restrain trade, it is not to be used indiscriminately, without regard to the type of violation or whether other
effective methods, less harsh, are available."34
This "judicial restraint" is firmly approved by the committee, and
with good reason. Surgery, whether medical or antitrust, is inherently
a remedy of last resort. The risks attending it, the difficulty of its execution and the shock which it inevitably brings all require that it be
used with the utmost caution. All other less drastic methods of competitive restoration must be first considered. The committee urges the
Antitrust Division to seek these remedies only if the tests of clear
necessity, practicability and basic fairness are met. And the division
is advised to consider the effects of a possible resultant disruption upon
the industry involved, its markets and the public needs in time of
peace and war. It is emphasized that such an appraisal "seems a prime
responsibility of any antitrust enforcement agency."
A few members attack the Supreme Court's Timken opinion for its
"solicitude" for the "right of amalgamation" 35 and label the 11:?-ajority
as "even hostile to the breaking up of monopolies when they have
been proved illegal."36 There would seem to be no basis whatever for
this characterization of the Report. In the very few cases in which an
outright illegal monopoly has been found to exist, the courts have taken
the necessary steps, and the Report does not suggest that anything
different should have been done. 37
33 REPORT 354. On these remedies generally, see Oppenheim, "Divestiture as a Rem•
edy Under the Federal Antitrust Laws-Economic Background,'' 19 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
119 (1950); Timberg, "Justifications for Divestitute,'' id. at 132; Van Cise, "Limitations
on Divestiture," id. at 147. Brown, ''Injunctions and Divestiture,'' A.B.A. Antitrust
Section Proceedings, Aug. 18-19, 1954, 129 at 138. Cf. Adams, "Dissolution, Divorcement,
Divestiture: the Pyrrhic Victories of Antitrust,'' 27 IND. L. J. I (1951).
MTimken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 at 603, 71 S.Ct. 971
(1951).
35 The implication of the dissent seems to be that the committee approved the refusal
of the Court to order divestiture in the Timken case. The committee approved the general language quoted above in the text, but at another place in the Report the committee
states that the "obvious remedy should have been dissolution" in the Timken case. REPORT
36. See Adelman, "General Comment on the Schwartz Dissent," I ANn-rnusT BULLE·
TIN 71 at 77 (1955).
36REPORT 357.
37 See REPoRT·354. And see the discussion of §2 of the Sherman Act in the REroRT'p. 43 et seq.
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Consent Settlement Procedures

Settlement is a much-desired goal in any kind of litigation. In
antitrust it is of unusual importance. To the government it means
greater economy and broader enforcement, and to the defendants it
may mean an opportunity to avoid a protracted expensive trial attended
by unfavorable publicity and potentially to be followed by treble
damage litigation. 38 The Report notes that from 1935 to date 72 percent of the civil actions brought by the government were terminated
by consent, emphasizes the need for workable procedures, and recommends several methods for their improvement.
The Report endorses the use of negotiations in advance of £.ling of
a complaint. The Antitrust Division has recently experimented with
this approach and the present head of the division has stated that by
this method he hopes to "promote Hexibility and ease compromise in the
process of decree negotiation."39 A complaint may harden the controversy and deter settlement. And time and money may be consumed
in trial preparation and preliminary court proceedings before settlement is reached. The new procedure is a good one and deserves support.
The committee criticizes the established practice of the department
in requiring defendants to submit the initial draft of a consent d~cree in
settlement negotiations and recommends that the department revise
this practice in the future by submitting an initial draft "in response to
a good faith request by defendants." The reason for the present policy
apparently stems from the fear of the department that it will be accused of threatening or starting litigation to force a settlement. Perhaps it has accordingly been thought that the initial step in formalizing
negotiations by submitting a draft decree must be taken by the defendants. 40 But as long as criminal proceedings are not used to coerce
civil settlements, the department would be above criticism in submitting
the initial draft as recommended by the committee. The committee's
The dissenting members recommend the creation of a new agency to be called the
"Federal Free Enterprise Commission" to be granted some very great powers and to take
some powers from the Federal Trade Commission and the attorney general. This suggestion would merely further complicate the already somewhat anomalous situation of
two existing enforcemeµt agencies and was rightly not approved by a majority of the committee.
38 See Barnes, "Settlement by Consent Judgment,'' AB.A. Antitrust Section Proceedings, April 1-2, 1954, p. 8; Horsky, "Settlement," id. Aug. 18-19, 1954, p. 102.
39 Barnes, supra note 38, at 12.
40 See Berge, ''Remedies Available to the Government Under the Sherman Act,''
7 I.Aw AND CoNJ.'.EM. PnoB. 104 at 108 (1940).
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proposal if adopted would avoid guesswork by the defendants as to
what the department is really interested in, and would shorten negotiations and decrease expense. It should be adopted.

4.

Trial

The Report deals only briefly with four general issues concerning
the conduct of trials. It' recommends (I) that one judge should be
assigned throughout a given case for all purposes; (2) that the issues
to be tried be defined with as great particularity as possible before trial
with the use of pre-trial conferences, motions for more definite statement, interrogatories calling for statement of the issues and pre-trial
statement of the issues as a prelude to extensive use of discovery; (3)
that the Oregon State Medical Society opinion41 be the guide in limiting the proof of events long since past; and ( 4) that certain types of
issues be segregated and tried separately in the interest of efficiency.
These and many other trial problems are more fully treated in the
Judicial Conference Report on Procedure in Anti-Trust and Other
Protracted Cases42 and in the report of the American Bar Association
Anti-Trust Section Committee on Practice and Procedure in the Trial
of Anti-Trust Cases.43 The suggested assignment of one judge to a
given case for all purposes would seem to be elementary good sense
in these complex cases and it is standard practice in many districts. The
full use of devices in advance of trial to particularize the issues, if fairly
done, may help considerably in reducing time and expense and in
facilitating a wise decision. And the segregation of certain issues for
separate trial is sound procedure.44
The treatment which the Report gives to the problem of limiting the
period of time prior to the filing of the complaint as to which proof
may be made, however, would seem to deserve special comment here.
The committee recommends that in all civil proceedings, including
treble damage suits, the Oregon State Medical Society opinion "should
be the guide wher~ the proof offered by either party reaches back more
than a reasonable number of years." 45 There follows the statement
United States v. Oregon State Medical Society, 343 U.S. 326, 72 S.Ct. 690 (1952).
13 F.R.D. 62 (1951).
43 REPORT oF THE CoMMITTEE oN PRAcnCE AND PROCEDURE rn THE TRIAL oF
ANnntuST CASHs OF THE SncnoN OF ANnntusT LAw OF THE .AMEmcAN BAR AssoCIATION (1954). See generally the bibliography at pp. 58-60 of that report.
44 On pre-trial problems, see Chadwell, "Pre-Trial," A.B.A.. Antitrust Section Proceedings, Aug. 18-19, 1954, p. 52. On trial problems, see Day, "Trial,'' A.B.A. Antitrust Section Proceedings, Aug. 18-19, 1954, p. 65.
45 REPORT 364. The Report recommends that its guides be used also in criminal proceedings, where appropriate.
41
42
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that "if that case's teaching is not followed by trial counsel, the court
should by pretrial order limit the proof" in accordance with certain
guides set forth in the Report, and that "in appropriate cases, a pretrial
order should fix a cut-off date for proof."
The Oregon State Medical Society decision is certainly auftiority
that "archeology" and "ancient history" should be cut to _th_e bone.46
But the opinion itself offers little or no "guide" for procedure in future
cases. The proof of past misdeeds of the defendants from I 936 to
I 94 I was in the record in that case and the proofs were closed before
the court rejected this old evidence as irrelevant to the claim for present
injunctive relief. Thus the expense and time involved in defending
against stale evidence had been incurred, and the potentiality of confusion of the legitimate issues to the prejudice of the defense was already serious. It will be impossible to know in advance of trial whether
counsel will follow the "teaching" of this case. But if a meanjngful
limitation of proof is to be accomplished, a_s it certainly should be in
many cases, procedures must be followed which will establish the
principles of the limitation, and possibly an actual cut-off date, in
advance of trial so that preparation may be ma~e accordingly and the
possibility of prejudice at the trial, particularly before a jury, may be
avoided.
In this respect the Report is a weakened version of the recommendations of the Committee on Practice and Procedure of the
American Bar Association,47 both in its lack of clarity with respect to
general procedure to be followed and in its failure forthrightly to call
for establishment of a cut-off date wherever possible. It is to be hoped
that the courts will bolster the Report of the Attorney General's Committee with the recommendations of the American Bar Association
Committee. Pursuant to these latter recommendations, the period of
inquiry should be defined and limited by the trial judge in conference
prior to trial. The plaintiff should be required to present evidence
tending to show a case of present violations of law, at least within a
period of five or six years prior to the filing of the complaint before
being permitted to introduce evidence of an earlier period as to origins
or background of the conspiracy. And when the circumstances permit,
the court should establish a strict cut-off date, forbidding introduction
46 United States v. Oregon State Medical Society, 343 U.S. 326, 72 S.Ct. 690 (1952),
noted in 38 A.B.A.J. 764 (1952), 66 HARV. L. Rnv. 89 at 139 (1952). The government
introduced evidence of conspiratorial activity from 1936 to 1941; abandonment of the
activity after 1941 was shown; the lower court refused to attach significance to the earlier
misconduct in light of the abandonment, and the Supreme Court upheld this ruling.
47 See note 43 supra.
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of any evidence of activities of defendants prior to that date. 48 Anything less than these procedures will provide little insurance against
the continuation of the wasteful prejudicial practice of seeking future
relief upon the basis of ancient and long-since abandoned corporate
mistakes. 49

5.

Compliance With and Modi-fication of Antitrust Judgments

The committee urges the Department of Justice to conduct regular
studies to determine whether its judgments "have been effective to
restore competition," and suggests use of the Federal Trade Commission for this purpose.50 The committee, apparently by unanimous
agreement, also recommends that the department "should consent to
judgment modification where the defendant can show that a change
in circumstances makes its continuation unchanged incompatible with
antitrust goals."51 A decree which outlives its usefulness and impairs
legitimate competitive activity may be as harmful to the antitrust policy
as the lack of enforcement of a needed decree. But it is pointed out
that in the past the department has refused to agree to substantial
modification of even the broadest decree provisions under any circumstances.52
The committee recommendation on modification is important. Injustice has existed in past procedures, and the ~epartment's reluctance
to consent to modifications constitutes a deterrent to consent decree
settlements. Lawyers negotiating consent decrees must contend with
the justifiable fear that a decree once entered may rapidly acquire immortality irrespective of later changes in competitive conditions. This
fear is frequently so substantial as to prevent settlement, whereas if
fair consideration of future requests for modification could be assured,
the settlement might be agreed to. The department need sacrifice none
of its powers in carrying out the committee's recommendation. All
that is required is a demonstration of a willingness to negotiate changes
where antitrust goals will be promoted.
48See Chadwell, ''Pre-Trial,'' A.B.A. Antitrust Section Proceedings, Aug. 18-19, 1954,
p. 52 at 58.
49 Cf. Kramer, "Some Procedural Problems in Protracted Antitrust Trials,'' U. of
Mich. Law School Summer Institute, FEDERAL ANnntusT LAws 302 at 307-308 (1953).
50 REPORT 366. Section 6(c) of the Federal Trade Commission Act authorizes the
commission, upon application of the attorney general, to investigate and report upon how
antitrust decrees are being carried out.
51 REPORT 366.
52 See, generally, Kilgore, "Antitrust Judgments and Their Enforcement,'' A.B.A.
Antitrust Section Proceedings, April 1-2, 1954, p. 102 at 124-127.
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In this connection, the committee commends a provision recently
devised by the department for future decrees under which defendants
may, after a stated period of time, show that conditions have changed
so that the relief specified in the decree is no longer necessary. Also
commended is another recently designed provision expressly providing
for expiration of certain terms of the decree after a stated period of time.
These provisions are for use in decrees which ban otherwise lawful
conduct in order to dissipate the effects of unlawful practices, and are
not of general application for all decrees. They evidence, however, a
trend toward a general modification practice which would more nearly
comport with the over-all recommendation of the committee.

B. The Federal Trade Commission
The Report is unaccountably brief with respect to Federal Trade
Commission activities. "Committee attention . . . has focused onJy on
(1) The Trade Practice Conference, (2) informal settlement procedures, and (3) problems of enforcement of Commission orders and
penalties for violation."53 The administration and enforcement section thus parallels the substantive sections of the Report, which devote
little attention to Federal Trade Commission rulings, especially under
the "unfair methods of competition" proscriptions of section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act. It is not made clear whether this
silence indicates general approval of the commission side of the antitrust picture, or whether the committee simply was unable in the allotted time to make an adequate study of commission practice. In
point of fact, it is probable that at least as many antitrust proceedings
take place before the commission as before the courts. Although many
of the problems in commission hearings are the S?me as in judicial
proceedings, substantial differences exist, arising from the fact that
the commission is a law-making as well as law-enforcing agency and
conducts its hearings under the administrative rather than the judicial
process.
The committee may readily be forgiven for not launching into a
detailed study of the maze of inner workings of the administrative process as applied to antitrust cases. It is interesting to note, however,
that shortly after release of the committee report, another agency, the
Hoover Commission, issued a report calling for a complete separation
53Juu,onT 369.
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of the prosecuting and adjudication functions of the Federal Trade
Commission. 54 The Hoover Commission Report states:
'Where the proceeding before the administrative agency is
strictly judical in nature, and the remedy afforded by the agency
is one characteristically granted by courts, there can be no effective
protection of private rights unless there is a complete separation of
the prosecuting functions from the functions of decision." 55
The Hoover Report proposes the creation of a new "Administrative
Court of the United States" to be composed of a Tax Section, a Trade
Section and a Labor Section, to take over the decisional functions now
exercised by federal agencies operating within the indicated fields.
Apparently, if this proposal were adopted, the commission would con:tinue to issue complaints and prosecute them under the Federal Trade
Commission and Clayton Acts. Hearings, however, would be before
the new court and the court would issue or deny the requested cease
and desist or other orders.
The adoption of the Administrative Procedure Act of 194656 resulted in long strides toward correction of evils inherent in combination of prosecuting and judicial functions in a single agency. Under
this law, Hearing Examiners in Federal Trade Commission cases have
acquired an independence which they did not previously enjoy, and
have exhibited a commendable objectivity and judiciousness in consideration of contested matters. These improvements have been
further enhanced by the work of Chairman Howrey and the other
members of the present commission, which has greatly increased the
stature of that agency in recent years. Adoption of the Hoover Commission proposal could carry even further the improvements already
made. However, there are a number of conllicting considerations inherent in this important proposal which cannot be discussed in this
article and it is unfortunate that the distinguished group of antitrust
lawyers comprising the Attorney General's Committee did not address
themselves to this difficult and vital question.
The proposals which the committee makes as to Federal Trade
. Commission practice and procedure are all quite reasonable. Improvements in Trade Practice Conference procedures are suggested.
The new commission settlement procedure is approved. Legislative
54 REPORT OF COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE
GoVERNMBNT, "Legal Services and Procedure," 84-88 (1955).
55 Id. at 85.
56 5 U.S.C. (1952) §1001 et seq.
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change is proposed to eliminate the outlandish $5,000 per day penalty
for violation of final Federal Trade Commission Act orders. And it
is also proposed to remove the present inconsistency between the Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts by making Clayton Act cease
and desist orders become final after a lapse of time as do Commission
Act orders. These changes should all be adopted.57

C.

Related Jurisdiction of the Department of Justice and the
Federal Trade Commission

The committee endorses the present system ·of dual agency enforcement of the antitrust laws. It seems likely that were a completely
fresh start being made, the somewhat anomalous dual enfor~ement
procedure would be replaced by a single integrated system. Within
the framework of existing law, however, the committee finds acceptable procedures for coordination of the two agencies and for elimination of inconsistent or overlapping action. The two agencies today
maintain fairly effective liaison, and the committee urges further
improvements in cooperation and consultation.
The committee's final word on this matter should be faithfully
observed: "It is basic to all relations between the two agencies that
both should never for any reason, including differences in views as
to the law or the facts, proceed against the same parties for the same
offense growing out of the same factual situation."58

D. Private Antitrust Suits
Private suits are unquestionably an important adjunct of antitrust
enforcement and are the principal means whereby persons injured by
antitrust violations may be recompensed. As the Report notes, until
the past ten years, treble damage suits were most often unsuccessful.59
In recent years, however, there has been a "burgeoning" of these suits,
with numerous huge treble damage recoveries and awards of attorney's
369-374.
377. The committee doubtless had in mind the proceedings instituted by
both agencies against the cement industry for use of the basing point system. See Federal
Trade Commission v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 68 S.Ct. 793 (1948).
59 REPOR'l' 378.
57 fu.POR'l'
58 REPOR'l'
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fees. 60 Were the substantial law settled and all violations of it willful
in character, few would quarrel with the present requirement of mandatory trebling of the plaintiff's damages.
It is manifest, however, that the numerous ambiguities and vagaries
of the law expose the totally unwitting violator to the c;ontinued peril
of huge damage penalties for what to him reasonably seem normal and
honest business practices. This peril is especially great with respect to
liability under the Robinson-Patman Act, but it lurks as well in many
other areas of antitrust law. In private law, punitive damages for
tortious conduct are aw.arded only where malice, or at least willfulness
is present; actual damages are the law's only exaction from the merely
negligent wrongdoer. 61 Similarly, under other federal statutes which
allow more than actual damages, the imposition of amounts in excess
of actual damages is made discretionary with the court. 62 The inflexible
penalizing of antitrust defendants in private suits is unwarranted by
the nature of the substantive law and often leads to unconscionable
results.
.
To rectify the situation while retaining the treble penalty for the
knowing violator, the committee recommends enactment of legislation
making the doubling or trebling of damages discretionary with the
court. 63 The Report states:
"On balance, we favor vesting in the trial judge discretion to
impose double or treble damages. In all instances, this would recompense injured parties. Beyond compensation, tl,ie trial court
could then pen?lize the purposeful violator without imposing the
harsh penalty of multiple damages on inriocent actors." 64 ··
The committee acknowledges the difficulty of laying down any precise
standard for the judge's determination and recom:rpends that the matter be left to hi? discretion, as it is under other statutes with similar
provisions.
60 REPORT 378. For exhaustive discussion and statistics, see comment, 61 YALE L. J.
1010 (1952).
61 PnossER, ToRTs 11-13 (1941).
62 Housing and Rent Act, 61 Stat. L. 199 (1947), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App.
(1952) §1895. Defense Production Act, 64 Stat. L. 811 (1950), as amended, 50 U.S.C.
App. (1952) §2109(c); Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. (1952) §§1, IOI(e); Patent Act, 35
U.S.C.A. (1952) §284; Trademark Act, 60 Stat. L. 439 (1946), 15 U.S.C. (1952)
§1117.
63 A bill now in Congress would effect this change: H.R. 4958, 84th Cong., 1st
sess. (1955), introduced on March 15, 1955, by Congressman Walter, and referred to
the House Committee on the Judiciary.
64fuPORT 379.
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This recommendation, though dissented to by several members,
seems entirely reasonable and contains no serious threat to the continued effectiveness of the private suit. Ability of the plaintiff to
prove violation and recover both actual damages and attorney's fees is
not affected, and modem liberalized rules of damages supply ample
lure to provide incentive to sue without the added windfall of punitive
recoveries. Nor, as the committee notes, will the recommended change
affect the conduct of potential defendants. The unwitting violator
is not affected by the threat of damages, for he does not know his peril.
The willful violator, on the other hand, may be held for treble damages
as in the past. It is to be hoped that Congress will act promptly on
this recommendation.
The Report contains three other important proposals for change
in the private suit aspects of the law. A federal four-year statute of
limitations is recommended to bring much-needed order out of the
existing confusion resulting from the lack of a federal statute and the
consequent application of state law.65 Modifications in section 5 of
the Clayton Act, providing for use of evidence of government judgments in related private actions and tolling of the statute of limitations
during the pendency of government actions, are recommended. 66 And
legislation is urged authorizing the United States itself to recover
actual damages for violations directly affecting the government. 67
These recommendations constitute perfecting amendments to existing
law to resolve present inconsistencies in the availability of the private
action. They are sensible and should be adopted.

Conclusion

The gigantic character of antitrust litigation assures that vexatious
problems of administration and procedure will always persist. But the
Report of the committee demonstrates that many rational reforms are
possible. The committee properly rejects the idea that the American
judicial system is incapable of absorbing and successfully managing
65 H.R. 4954, 84th Cong., 1st sess. (1955), providing for a uniform four-year statute
of limitations, has been passed by the House and sent to the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary at this writing.
66 REPORT 380 et seq.
67 H.R. 4954 in the present Congress would give this right to the government by overruling United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 61 S.Ct. 742 (1941).
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the ''big case." 68 While some of its recommendations are controversial,
in the main the Report offers a blueprint for substantial increase in the
effectiveness and fairness of antitrust administration.
68 REPORT

366.

